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The notion of "cruel and unusual punishments"l in the 
twenty-first century embodies a number of different concepts. A 
punishment might be deemed "cruel and unusual" because it 
constitutes torture, or because it is grossly disproportionate to 
the crime, or perhaps because of the arbitrary and capricious way 
in which it is administered.2 In this symposium contribution, I 
turn to yet another concept of "cruel and unusual 
punishments"-punishments that violate society's "evolving 
standards of decency." 
Other doctrines under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause may be problematic in practice, but none are as 
controversial in theory as the "evolving standards of decency" 
doctrine. Under the doctrine, a punishment violates the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause when a national consensus 
has formed against it, prohibiting a practice only after a majority 
of states have already done so on their own.3 Scholars have 
• Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I would like to thank 
Paul Marcus for encouraging me to participate in this symposium and the 
Charleston Law Review for its gracious invitation. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted"). 
2. I discuss each of these concepts below. See infra notes 9-40 and 
accompanying text. 
3. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (invalidating juvenile 
death penalty upon finding that a national consensus had formed against it); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (invalidating death penalty for mentally 
retarded offenders upon same finding); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 
(1989) (upholding juvenile death penalty upon finding of insufficient evidence of 
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bemoaned the notion of constitutional protection that caters to, 
rather than constrains, majority will for decades4-and the 
doctrine's detractors are not just pointy-headed academics. In 
editorial after editorial, casual and not-so-casual observers alike 
have questioned the propriety of the Supreme Court rubber-
stamping what most state legislatures do just because most state 
legislatures do it.5 Surely constitutional protection does not 
a national consensus against it); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) 
(upholding death penalty for mentally retarded offenders upon same finding); 
see also Simmons, 543 U.S. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Laws enacted by 
the Nation's legislatures provide the 'clearest and most reliable objective 
evidence of contemporary values."'(quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331)). 
4. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 69 (1980) ("[l]t 
makes no sense to employ the value judgments of the majority as the vehicle for 
protecting minorities from the value judgments of the majority."); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 88 
n.200 (1989) ("The preferences of the majority should not determine the nature 
of the [E]ighth [A]mendment or of any other constitutional right."); Tonja 
Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State 
Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 
1089, 1113 (2006) ("[D]eclaring an action unconstitutional because a significant 
number of states prohibit the practice leaves the Supreme Court enforcing 
constitutional protections only in cases where they are least needed."); Michael 
S. Moore, Morality in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. 
PoL'Y 47, 63 (2008) ("What is the worth of a right good against the majority 
when that same majority interprets that right?"); John F. Stinneford, The 
Original Meaning of "Unusual':· The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel 
Innovation, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1739, 1753-54 (2008) ("Leaving aside these 
methodological problems, the evolving standards of decency test also suffers 
from a deeper theoretical problem, in that it appears to make the rights of 
criminal defendants dependent upon public opinion."). 
5. Steve Chapman, On Supreme Court's Definition of Cruelty, CHI. TRIB., 
Mar. 3, 2005, at C21 ("But the real flaw in the reasoning of both sides is the 
whole idea of deferring to public opinion. . . . It's only when there is not a 
national consensus that the court has a reason to step in."); Opinion, A Welcome 
Death-Penalty Decision, But One with Cracks in Its Reasoning, THE MORNING 
CALL (Allentown, Pa.) Mar. 3, 2005, at A12 ("But the Supreme Court must be 
wary of using the wishes of the majority to steer its interpretation of the 
Constitution. Part of the Constitution's genius, after all, is that it protects 
individuals by preventing tyranny by the majority. Rights can never be 
submitted for a vote."); Opinion, Justices Out on a Limb: A Healthy Moral 
Decision on Juvenile Capital Punishment Arrives Via a Path Strewn with 
Logical and Legal Dangers, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio) Mar. 4, 2005, 
at B8 ("Nor is it comforting to hear the [C]ourt majority cite the will of the 
people as a factor in this decision. The Supreme Court was not created to be 
responsive to public whim. Its members serve for life precisely so they are 
insulated against the vagaries of popularity."); Debra J. Saunders, Editorial, 
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depend on whether a majority of states agree with it. Isn't 
putting limits on majority will what the Constitution is for? 
On the flip side of the "evolving standards" debate are the 
textualists, who claim that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 
against "cruel and unusual punishments" justifies protection 
that follows majority preferences.6 Mter all (the argument goes), 
if a punishment is not unusual-if it has not been rejected by a 
majority of jurisdictions-then it cannot be "cruel and unusual."7 
By this view, explicitly majoritarian Eighth Amendment doctrine 
is simply a reflection of explicitly majoritarian Eighth 
Amendment text. 
So stated, the "evolving standards" debate ends a stalemate. 
Majoritarian protection may not make sense as a matter of 
constitutional theory, but it makes sense as a matter of 
constitutional text. As such, the legitimacy of the "evolving 
standards" doctrine stands largely as a given-an unfortunate 
given for some, but a given nonetheless. 
European Justice Rules Top U.S. Court, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 3, 2005, at B9 
("Kennedy also cited a 'national consensus' in America against the juvenile-
death penalty as a reason to overturn it. I must ask: Since when has the 
[C]ourt issued rulings based on what average folks think?"); Robert Weisberg, 
Op-Ed., Cruel and Unusual Jurisprudence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at A21 
("Of course, this approach raises the perfectly reasonable question of how the 
scope of the Bill of Rights, which was designed to limit the powers of legislative 
majorities, could depend in part on the decisions of those very majorities."). 
6. Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Structure, Judicial Discretion, and 
the Eighth Amendment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1149, 1200 (2006) (arguing that 
a consensus among three-fourths of the states satisfies this requirement: "Of 
course, even if a punishment is 'cruel,' it must also be 'unusual' to trigger 
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment."); William C. Heffernan, Constitutional 
Historicism: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment Evolving Standards of 
Decency Test, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1355, 1414 (2005) (recognizing textualists' claim 
that "the term 'unusual' provides a unique license for judicial appeals to 
changing convictions and practices"); Jacobi, supra note 4, at 1098 ("A response 
to this criticism [of majoritarian protection] is that, while this may be true of 
constitutional interpretation generally, the phrase 'cruel and unusual' 
necessitates an inquiry into social mores and practices to determine what is 
unusual."). 
7. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If [a punishment] is 
not unusual, that is, if an objective examination of laws and jury 
determinations fails to demonstrate society's disapproval of it, the punishment 
is not unconstitutional even if out of accord with the theories of penology 
favored by the Justices of this Court."). 
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Yet it need not be so. In the discussion that follows, I explore 
the evolution of the "evolving standards" doctrine to make a point 
about its legitimacy and Supreme Court decisionmaking under 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause more generally. In 
Part I, I trace the origins of the doctrine to its present state. In 
Part II, I turn to lessons learned from the evolution of "evolving 
standards," questioning the textual defense of the doctrine and 
the constraining power of law itself. I conclude that while the 
"evolving standards" doctrine is problematic, it is not the crux of 
the problem. Supreme Court decisionmaking in the death 
penalty arena will reflect "evolving standards of decency" 
whether the doctrine says so or not. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF "EVOLVING STANDARDS OF 
DECENCY'' 
One of the wonderful things about the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
is that before the 1970s, there was so little of it. The Supreme 
Court decided only six cases under the Clause in the first 175 
years of its existence, and the first of these came almost 100 
years after the Bill of Rights was ratified.s Being an expert on 
the Eighth Amendment-something that today requires the 
skills of a doctrinal Houdini-was at one time not so difficult to 
do. 
In part, this simplistic state of doctrinal affairs was due to 
the fact that the Framers thought the words "cruel and unusual 
punishments" were intended only as a prohibition on torture 
when they copied them from the English Declaration of Rights of 
1689.9 As it turns out, they were wrong about that-the phrase 
"cruel and unusual punishments" in the English Declaration of 
8. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 
9 (2007). 
9. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979-85 (1991) (discussing in 
depth commentary from the First Congress, state ratification debates, 
contemporary observers, and early common law that the Framers understood 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to prohibit "certain modes of 
punishment," particularly torture). See also infra note 10. 
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Rights was not about torture after all,IO proving that even the 
Framers could get questions of original intent wrong. 
Nevertheless, the Framers thought the phrase was about torture, 
or at least the Supreme Court thought that the Framers thought 
it was about torture.n Thus, the earliest interpretation of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was that it prohibited 
torturous punishments-''burning at the stake, crucifixion, 
breaking on the wheel, or the like"l2-sanctions marked by the 
gratuitous infliction of pain. Under this interpretation of the 
Clause, the words "cruel" and "unusual" were read as one, 
prohibiting punishments that were unusually cruel. 
The problem with this reading-if one could call it a 
problem-was that by 1789, when the Eighth Amendment was 
ratified, the use of torture had pretty much died out on its own.1a 
10. See Steven A. Blum, Public Executions: Understanding the "Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments" Clause, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 446-47 (1992) 
(discussing origins of the English Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and 
concluding: "But what the British actually intended is significantly less 
important than what the American Framers thought the British had intended. 
Unquestionably, the Framers had the [torturous] Bloody Assizes in mind."); 
Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The 
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969) (arguing that the Framers 
thought the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibited torture, but 
that they misinterpreted the English Bill of Rights of 1689). 
11. See supra note 10; see also infra note 13. Two scholars have questioned 
the Framers' understanding of cruel and unusual punishments; thus, the 
Supreme Court's comprehension of the Framers' understanding may be wrong. 
See Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARv. J.L. 
& PUB. POL'Y 119, 122-23 (2004) (arguing that "unusual" refers to selective or 
irregular application of harsh penalties); John F. Stinneford, The Original 
Meaning of "Unusual':· The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 
102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1739, 1767 (2008) (arguing that the Framers thought "cruel 
and unusual" meant "contrary to long usage"). 
12. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890). Accord Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 
U.S. 130, 135-36 {1878) ("Difficulty would attend the effort to define with 
exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel 
and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that 
punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary 
cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution."). 
13. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving 
Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 
989, 997 (1978) (''Moreover, as long as the Court took for granted that the clause 
extended only to punishments that the Framers thought cruel in 1789, there 
was little need to invoke it; for there was little danger that an American 
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Thus, while the Supreme Court heard a few claims of torture 
under the Clause (three, to be exact: death by public shooting,14 
death by electrocution,15 and so-called "death by installments"16), 
there was not much for the Court to say. So what if the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibited torture. Society 
had already moved past that, making the Eighth Amendment's 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause a virtual dead letter in 
constitutional law. 
In 1910, the Supreme Court revived the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause with the venerable decision Weems v. 
United States.11 Weems involved a fifteen-year sentence of 
cadena temporal-hard labor while chained at the ankles and 
wrists-for the crime of forging a public document.lS The 
punishment itself was clearly not torture, but just as clearly, it 
seemed torturous-unusually cruel-in light of the crime. What 
would bend, clear constitutional meaning or the Justices' sense of 
fairness? In a five-to-two decision,19 the Court explained: 
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and 
purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of 
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This 
is peculiarly true of constitutions .... The [Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause] may be therefore progressive, and is not 
fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public 
legislature would authorize the rack, the wheel, or drawing and quartering as 
criminal punishments."). See also Granucci, supra note 10, at 842 ("Since the 
'barbarities' of Stuart England were not used often in America, the clause was 
rarely invoked in the courts."). 
14. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (upholding death by public shooting). 
15. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447 (upholding death by electrocution). 
16. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (194 7) 
(upholding repeated attempts at execution so long as state did not intend 
lingering death); Id. at 474 (Burton, J., dissenting) (lamenting majority's 
affirmance of "death by installments"). 
17. 217 u.s. 349, 382 (1910). 
18. Id. at 359, 363-64. 
19. Id. at 357 n.1 (Only seven Justices heard arguments for this case; 
Justice Moody was absent due to an illness, Justice Lurton had not taken his 
seat yet, and Justice Brener died before the opinion was delivered. The 
majority consisted of Justices McKenna, Harlan, Day, and Chief Justice Fuller. 
The dissenters were Justices White and Holmes.). 
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opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.2o 
Ours was a living constitution, the Court was saying, which 
justified recognizing an interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause that the Framers had not: a punishment 
also could be cruel and unusual because it was grossly 
disproportionate to the crime.21 
In the present discussion, Weems was an incredibly 
important case not only because it unmoored the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause from its original meaning, but also 
because of the proportionality case that would follow it.22 At the 
time, the Supreme Court's 1958 decision in Trop v. Dulles23 could 
not have seemed like the groundbreaking decision it became. 
Mter all, it was just the next proportionality case following 
Weems.24 Trop involved a soldier's expatriation--complete loss of 
United States citizenship-as a punishment for his wartime 
desertion of his post for a day.2s As in Weems, the Court found 
the punishment to be grossly excessive in light of the crime and 
thus invalidated it under the Eighth Amendment.26 Having only 
Weems to rely on as precedent, the Court in Trop explained: 
[W]hen the Court was confronted with a punishment of 
[twelve] years in irons at hard and painful labor imposed for 
the crime of falsifying public records, it did not hesitate to 
declare that the penalty was cruel in its excessiveness and 
unusual in its character. The Court recognized in that case 
that the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that 
their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.27 
Importantly, the Supreme Court in Trop was just paraphrasing 
20. Id. at 373, 378. 
21. See id. at 367. 
22. See id. 
23. 356 u.s. 86 (1958). 
24. Id. at 100. 
25. Id. at 87-88. 
26. Id. at 103. 
27. Id. at 100--01 (citations omitted). 
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Weems, echoing its embrace of a progressive, living constitution.2s 
In neither of these cases was the Court advocating the use of 
contemporary standards in and of themselves as a substantive 
Eighth Amendment doctrine.29 
Then came Furman. Decided in 1972, Furman v. Georgia3o 
has to be the strangest death penalty case in history, and there 
are plenty to choose from. For trivia buffs, it is also the longest 
decision in Supreme Court history, spanning a grand 233 pages 
in the official reports.3I Furman, as most everyone knows, is the 
case that struck down the death penalty (at least until the 
Supreme Court brought it back).32 As I have discussed in detail 
elsewhere, every shred of then-existing doctrine pointed away 
from the result in Furman; the Justices invalidated the death 
penalty because they wanted to, not because they had to.33 The 
problem became justifying as a matter of law what five Justices 
had decided as a matter of principle, and that is where the 
decision's length comes into play.34 In the absence of any 
plausible legal theory to get the Justices where they wanted to 
go, they each went their own way, writing nine separate opinions 
with each of the five concurrences garnering only one vote.35 As 
Norman Finkel so aptly described it, "Furman has the feel of an 
anthology desperately in need of an editor."36 The decision was 
an unmitigated doctrinal disaster, and I say that with great 
fondness for its result. 
For the purpose of this discussion, what mattered in Furman 
was that two concurring Justices-Justices Brennan and 
Marshall-made a bold doctrinal move in suggesting that a 
punishment could be "cruel and unusual" for no reason other 
28. Id. 
29. See id.; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
30. 408 u.s. 238 (1972). 
31. See Lain, supra note 8, at 10-11. 
32. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239--40. See also infra note 40 (discussing 
revival of death penalty in 1976). 
33. See Lain, supra note 8, at 9--18. 
34. Id. at 11. 
35. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. 
36. NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE 
LAw 172 (1995). 
668 
2010) Lessons Learned 
than that it had become unpopular.37 Quoting Trop out of 
context, Justices Brennan and Marshall contended for the first 
time that the notion of "evolving standards of decency'' was not 
just an interpretive principle reflecting the progressive nature of 
a living constitution, but a substantive prohibition under the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as wen.as When society 
rejected a punishment (and one could plausibly say that about 
the death penalty in the wake of the 1960s abolition 
movement),39 then that punishment was no longer consistent 
with the "evolving standards of decency" embodied in the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause and was therefore 
unconstitutional. 40 
Given Furman's particularly inhospitable legal context-
truly, the Justices were grasping for straws-and the 
particularly hospitable social and political context in which the 
case was decided, this innovation is not hard to understand. 
Still, only two Justices propounded the "evolving standards" 
theory in Furman and thus the case would come to stand for 
something else-a prohibition against the arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of death, which Justices Brennan and 
Marshall had also signed onto. 41 The notion of "evolving 
standards of decency" as a substantive component of the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause would remain dormant until 
four years later, when the Supreme Court brought the death 
penalty back. 
The 1976 landmark Gregg v. Georgia42 not only revived the 
death penalty and ushered in the modern era of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
37. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 270 n.10, 277-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); 
id. at 332-72 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
38. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 327, 329 
(Marshall, J., concurring). 
39. See Lain, supra note 8, at 19-41 (discussing historical context of 
Furman). 
40. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 269-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 329-
32 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
41. See id. at 281-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 342-71 (Marshall, 
J., concurring); see also Lain, supra note 8, at 14-15 (discussing concurring 
opinions in Furman and emerging rationale for the ruling). 
42. 428 u.s. 153 {1976). 
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Clause, but it also completed the evolution of the "evolving 
standards" doctrine. Few scholars have looked closely at what 
the Court did on that score, but I submit the inquiry is well 
worth our attention. Coming into the decision, the Justices were 
once again in a doctrinally tight spot. Furman had held (to the 
extent it had held anything) that the arbitrary and capricious 
imposition of death violated the Eighth Amendment-and in a 
due process decision the year before Furman, the Court had held 
that standards guiding discretion in the imposition of death were 
not required because they provided "no protection against the 
jury determined to decide on whimsy or caprice."43 For the Court 
to hold, as it did in Gregg, that the same standards that provided 
no protection against whimsy or caprice could now be relied on to 
provide protection against whimsy and caprice was not exactly 
its best foot forward. And the Court did not start there; that was 
where it ended.44 Instead, the Justices in Gregg started with 
what was quite possibly the best argument they had-"evolving 
standards of decency." 
Why the plurality in Gregg would have been drawn to the 
notion of "evolving standards" as a substantive doctrine requires 
some knowledge of the larger social and political backdrop 
against which the case was decided. Between 1972, when the 
43. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971). The entirety of the 
quote is worth noting: 
It is apparent that such criteria do not purport to provide more than 
the most minimal control over the sentencing authority's exercise of 
discretion. They do not purport to give an exhaustive list of the 
relevant considerations or the way in which they may be affected by 
the presence or absence of other circumstances. They do not even 
undertake to exclude constitutionally impermissible considerations. 
And, of course, they provide no protection against the jury determined 
to decide on whimsy or caprice. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
44. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07 ("No longer can a jury wantonly and 
freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the 
legislative guidelines."). Interestingly, the Justices in Gregg acknowledged 
McGautha only by the vague reference, "some have suggested that standards to 
guide a capital jury's sentencing deliberations are impossible to formulate .... " 
Id. at 193. Indeed "some" had, including four of the plurality Justices in Gregg. 
See Lain, supra note 8, at 57-58 & n.336 (comparing holdings and voting 
patterns in McGautha and Gregg). 
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Court decided Furman, and 1976, when the Court decided Gregg, 
support for the death penalty made a sharp rebound, marking 
one of the most dramatic backlashes to a Supreme Court decision 
the nation has ever seen. By 1976, thirty-five states had passed 
new death penalty statutes, 45 death sentences had hit the highest 
year-end figure ever recorded, 46 and public opinion polls showed 
support for the death penalty at a ratio of two-to-one-a twenty-
five-year high.47 Why this was so is a story all unto itself, and 
one I have explored in depth elsewhere.4B For the purpose of the 
present discussion, the point is that the Supreme Court was 
under tremendous pressure to find a way to make the death 
penalty work as a matter of constitutional law-and the one 
thing the Justices in Gregg could say and still pass the laugh-out-
loud test was that the ruling had society's "evolving standards of 
decency'' on its side. And that is exactly what the plurality in 
Gregg did. 
The Justices in Gregg began their analysis where Justices 
Brennan and Marshall left off, recognizing "an assessment of 
contemporary values" as a key component of Eighth Amendment 
protection.49 They then pointed out that contemporary standards 
supported the constitutionality of the death penalty, finding 
particularly persuasive the fact that thirty-five states had passed 
new death penalty statutes in Furman's wake.5o Never mind the 
fact that the litigants had not made the "evolving standards" 
argument (and understandably so, as it had only been floated 
once and had commanded only two of the Justices' votes).51 And 
45. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80 (listing and discussing new death 
penalty statutes). 
46. See Lain, supra note 8, at 48-49 (discussing surge in death sentences 
in the wake of Furman and an all-time high of 298 death sentences in 1975). 
The fact that some states had passed mandatory death penalty statutes in 
response to Furman undoubtedly skewed this figure. 
47. See id. at 49 (discussing public opinion polling data in the wake of 
Furman). 
48. See id. at 46-55 (discussing backlash to Furman and explanation for 
it). 
49. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
50. See id. at 179-81. 
51. Thirty-five pages of the petitioner's thirty-six page brief were 
addressed to the arbitrariness with which the death penalty continued to be 
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never mind the fact that the argument was a complete non 
sequitur-"evolving standards" was not the reason the Court had 
struck down the death penalty in Furman, so it was hard to see 
how it could have been the reason to bring the death penalty 
back in Gregg. Indeed, it was hard to see how comporting with 
"evolving standards" could ever be reason enough to validate a 
punishment-at most, it simply removed one basis for declaring 
the punishment unconstitutional. In short, the plurality in 
Gregg not only formally adopted the "evolving standards" 
doctrine, but it did so while turning the doctrine completely on its 
head. 
Over the years, the "evolving standards" doctrine has become 
famous for doctrinal manipulation. In some cases, the Supreme 
Court considers only death penalty jurisdictions when counting 
states; in others, it does not.52 In some cases, the Court considers 
legislative and sentencing trends in its analysis; in others, it does 
not.53 In some cases, the Court considers the views of 
administered (as one would expect), and the last page argued that the death 
penalty was an excessive punishment. See Brief for Petitioner, Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (No. 74-6257), 1976 WL 178713. The respondent's 
ninety-three page brief likewise makes no mention of the argument. See Brief 
for Respondent, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (No. 74-6257), 1976 WL 
181754; see also LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 103 (1992) (noting that 
attorneys in Gregg tried to avoid "evolving standards" argument). 
52. Compare Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) ("[Thirty] States 
prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising [twelve] that have rejected the 
death penalty altogether and [eighteen] that maintain it but, by express 
provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach."), with 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) ("Of the [thirty-seven] States 
whose laws permit capital punishment, [fifteen] decline to impose it upon 16-
year-old offenders and [twelve] decline to impose it on 17-year-old offenders. 
This does not establish the degree of national consensus this Court has 
previously thought sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and 
unusual."). 
53. Compare Roper, 543 U.S. at 564, 566 ("In the present case, too, even in 
the [twenty] States without a formal prohibition on executing juveniles, the 
practice is infrequent. . . . Since Stanford, no State that previously prohibited 
capital punishment for juveniles has reinstated it. This fact, coupled with the 
trend toward abolition of the juvenile death penalty, carries special force in 
light of the general popularity of anticrime legislation, and in light of the 
particular trend in recent years toward cracking down on juvenile crime in 
other respects.") (citation omitted), with Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374 (''To the 
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professional organizations and international opinion; in others, it 
does not.54 We are accustomed to seeing the accusation that 
"evolving standards of decency'' is just a cover for the policy 
preferences of a majority of the Justices.ss But what we rarely, if 
ever, see is a discussion about manipulation in the birth of the 
doctrine itself. What might the evolution of the "evolving 
standards" doctrine add to the discussion? 
II. LESSONS LEARNED 
Four insights emerge from examining the evolution of 
"evolving standards." I discuss each in turn, beginning with the 
most modest point and moving in increasingly large concentric 
circles. 
First, the "evolving standards" doctrine may be plausible as a 
matter of constitutional text, but the closer one looks, the clearer 
it becomes that the textual defense of the doctrine is a house of 
cards. Constitutional text has little, if anything, to do with the 
reason we have an "evolving standards" doctrine. The doctrine 
contrary, it is not only possible, but overwhelmingly probable, that the very 
considerations which induce petitioners and their supporters to believe that 
death should never be imposed on offenders under [eighteen] cause prosecutors 
and juries to believe that it should rarely be imposed. This last point suggests 
why there is also no relevance to the laws cited by petitioners and their amici 
which set 18 or more as the legal age for engaging in various activities, ranging 
from driving to drinking alcoholic beverages to voting."). 
54. Compare Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 ("It is proper that we acknowledge the 
overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death 
penalty .... "), with Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n.l ("We emphasize that it is 
American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the contention of 
petitioners and their various amici ... that the sentencing practices of other 
countries are relevant." (citation omitted)). 
55. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Because I do 
not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more than the 
meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by the 
subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I 
dissent."); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting) ("[T]he Court's assessment of the current legislative judgment 
regarding the execution of defendants like petitioner more resembles a post hoc 
rationalization for the majority's subjectively preferred result rather than any 
objective effort to ascertain the content of an evolving standard of decency."); id. 
at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so 
obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members."). 
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exists because the Justices needed it, not because constitutional 
text invited or in some sense required it. Necessity is the mother 
of invention, so the adage goes, and that is no less true of legal 
doctrine than anything else. 
Indeed, if the evolution of "evolving standards" shows 
anything, it shows that the words "cruel and unusual" are 
susceptible to a number of plausible meanings. Conditioning 
constitutional protection on majoritarian sentiment may be one 
way to interpret the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against 
"cruel and unusual punishments," but it is not the only way, or 
even a particularly sensible way, to do so. In short, we ought to 
stop thinking about the "evolving standards" doctrine as a 
necessary byproduct of majoritarian Eighth Amendment text. 
The words "cruel and unusual" are not necessarily majoritarian, 
and in any event, when it comes to the "evolving standards" 
doctrine, text is largely-if not wholly-beside the point. 
Second, and as a corollary of the first, the evolution of the 
"evolving standards" doctrine is a potent reminder of the limits of 
law as a constraint on Supreme Court decisionmaking under the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. The cases that paved 
the road to "evolving standards" as a substantive doctrine show 
the Justices time and again rejecting the result that a cold 
reading of the law would provide in favor of what they thought 
was right. This was Weems and the birth of the proportionality 
principle. This was Furman and the repudiation of a death 
penalty administered in an arbitrary and capricious fashion. 
And this was Gregg, albeit as an example of the Justices' 
knowledge that what was "right" depended in part on what 
public opinion would allow. Liberals, conservatives, moderates-
all are guilty of bending the law to suit their purposes, and of 
course, the "evolving standards" doctrine is not unique in this 
regard. The point is bigger than "evolving standards of decency" 
and is as obvious as it is easily forgotten: Supreme Court Justices 
do not follow doctrine, doctrine follows them. The law may guide 
the Justices (when they want it to, depending on other 
institutional values and the strength of their personal policy 
674 
2010] Lessons Learned 
preferences),56 and it inevitably frames the debate, but it is 
difficult to conclude that something as malleable as law-
particularly of the constitutional variety-prevents the Justices 
from going where at least five of them want to go. 
That leads me to the third point: what is it then that affects 
where the Justices want to go in drawing the boundaries of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause? Here the discussion 
requires some nuance, a recognition that the Justices not only 
differ in their policy preferences, but also in the malleability of 
those policy preferences. Some Justices-think Justices Brennan 
and Marshall on the left, and Justices Rehnquist and Scalia on 
the right-have particularly strong views about the death 
penalty, and their voting records reflect that fact. Justice 
Rehnquist, for example, voted to affirm the death sentence in all 
but two of the thirty-three capital cases he heard, and in four of 
those cases, he was the lone dissenter.57 By the same token, 
Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to reverse the death 
sentence in every case before them after 1972.58 On both ends of 
the ideological spectrum, the Justices' policy preferences are 
strong and rigid, and neither the law nor anything else is likely 
to make a dent. Thus, it did not matter to Justices Brennan and 
Marshall that in 1976 the country was demanding that the Court 
bring the death penalty back; come what may, they voted to 
finish in Gregg what they had started in Furman in 1972.59 
Similarly, Justice Scalia has remained remarkably unaffected by 
the past decade's revelation of innocents on death row. "[The 
system] cannot be perfect," he has said, and "I don't think you 
can judge the validity of any criminal law system on the basis of 
whether now and then it might make a mistake."6o Times 
56. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 69-78 
(2007) (discussing the impact of institutional values like federalism on the 
Justices' pursuit of personal policy preferences when deciding death). 
57. See BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY 242-43 n.129 (1987). 
58. See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH Is DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, 
LAW, AND POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 138-39 (1987). 
59. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
60. See Justice Antonin Scalia, Speech at A Call for Reckoning: Religion 
and the Death Penalty Seminar (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://web.telia.com 
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change, but some Justices-again, on both ends of the political 
spectrum-are not likely to change with it. 
That said, the membership of the Supreme Court has, at 
least thus far, not been dominated by the ideological extremes. 
Despite the efforts of a good many presidents, the Court has 
remained more or less ideologically balanced for decades, with 
the moderate swing Justices determining much of the Court's 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause jurisprudence. In the 
1970s, it was swing Justices Stewart and White who cast the 
pivotal votes in Furman, and then (ironically) Gregg.st And more 
recently, it was swing Justices Kennedy and O'Connor who were 
responsible for the Court's flip-flop rulings on the death penalty 
for juveniles and mentally retarded offenders.s2 
What we know about these moderates is that they are not 
only less committed to any particular policy preference, but (as 
one might guess and empirical work has proven)63 they are also 
/-u15509119/scalia.htm (reproducing about the death penalty). The full quote 
is as follows: 
I d. 
I think the question, if I got it correctly, was do I think the death 
penalty is immoral because it will-1 have to say it-it will inevitably 
lead at some point to the condemnation of someone who is innocent. 
Well of course it will, I mean, you cannot have any system of human 
justice that is going to be perfect .... I don't think that the system 
becomes immoral because it cannot be perfect .... That's the best we 
can do in any human system, so I don't think you can judge the 
validity of any criminal law system on the basis of whether now and 
then it might make a mistake. 
61. See Lain, supra note 8, at 62 (comparing voting patterns of Justices 
White and Stewart in Furman and Gregg, and explaining their change of view). 
62. See Lain, supra note 56, at 34 (discussing the Justices voting patterns 
on the juvenile death penalty and death penalty for mentally retarded offenders 
and concluding, "In the end, both Atkins and Roper came out the way they did 
because one or both of the Court's swing voters-Justices Kennedy and 
O'Connor-switched sides."). 
63. See William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the 
Attitudinal Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic 
Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169, 189-93 (1996) ("[M]oderate justices are more 
consistently responsive to fluctuations in the public mood than either their 
liberal or conservative justices .... [T]he results strongly support the hypothesis 
that public opinion exerts significant direct effects upon some, though certainly 
not all Supreme Court justices."). 
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highly responsive to changes in public opinion on salient issues 
like the death penalty. As such, it should come as no surprise 
that Justices Stewart and White voted the way they did in 
Furman because they thought the death penalty was on its way 
out anyway,64 or that they went the other way in Gregg when it 
became apparent that the country had changed its mind.65 
Similarly, it should come as no surprise that Justices Kennedy 
and O'Connor supported the death penalty for juvenile and 
mentally retarded offenders in 1989,66 when public support for 
capital punishment was at an all-time high of seventy-nine 
percent,67-or that they went the other way on one or both of 
these issues in 2002 and 2005,68 when public support for the 
death penalty (as well as death sentences and executions) had 
plummeted to a twenty-year low.69 None of these pivotal rulings 
can be explained by the "evolving standards" doctrine or any 
other point of law, although they do reflect an evolved 
understanding of what the law should allow. 
Herein lies the irony of the "evolving standards" doctrine. 
The doctrine purports to identify contemporary standards of 
decency and mark constitutional protection thereby, but it is a 
sham; both in its inception and in its application, the Justices 
have used the "evolving standards" doctrine to get where they 
64. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE 
DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 617 (Del Dickson 
ed., 2001) (reporting Justice Stewart's remark in conference discussions on 
Furman that, "If we hold it constitutional in 1972, it would only delay its 
abolition."); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring) 
(reasoning that the death penalty cannot serve legitimate penological goals like 
deterrence because it "has for all practical purposes run its course"). 
65. See Lain, supra note 8, at 62 (discussing how the nation's renewed 
support of the death penalty influenced the position of Justices Stewart and 
White in Gregg). 
66. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (upholding death penalty 
for mentally retarded offenders); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) 
(upholding death penalty for juvenile offenders). 
67. See Lain, supra note 56, at 35-43 (discussing sociopolitical context of 
death penalty rulings in 1989). 
68. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (invalidating death penalty 
for juvenile offenders); Atkins for Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (invalidating 
death penalty for mentally retarded offenders). 
69. See id. at 43--54 (discussing post-2000 sociopolitical context of death 
penalty rulings). 
677 
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 4 
want to go. Yet where the Justices have wanted to go-at least 
for the pivotal swing voters-has been affected by a zeitgeist of 
larger social and political currents that have nothing to do with 
the law and can never be completely captured in doctrine. We 
can get rid of the "evolving standards" doctrine, but decisions 
driven by evolving societal standards are here to stay. 
This brings me to a fourth and final point. We tend to think 
of constitutional law as a means of constraining majoritarian 
impulses, protecting minorities from the vagaries of majority 
will. This is the reason the "evolving standards" doctrine is so 
controversial-it renders the countermajoritarian function of the 
Supreme Court an impossible task. Yet the evolution of the 
"evolving standards" doctrine turns this image on its head. The 
responsiveness of swing voters to public opinion suggests that the 
law does not constrain majoritarian impulses. Rather, 
majoritarian impulses constrain the law-and that is true 
whether or not we have a doctrine that says so explicitly. Where 
this leaves me is less interested in talking about the "evolving 
standards" doctrine (and other jurisprudence under the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause) and more interested in 
talking about the composition of the Court and how to move 
public opinion on the death penalty from the ground up. This, 
then, is perhaps the ultimate lesson learned from the evolution of 
the "evolving standards" doctrine: the evolution that matters 
most has little to do with the law. 
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